We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group to share political power with another group when the two have conflicting interests. There are two groups of participants, the "yellows" and the "blues". The yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a general election: a simplemajority rule that favors them, or a proportional rule. In two control treatments the blues can use a costly punishment option: they can punish the yellows after the outcome of the election, or after the choice of the electoral rule, but before the election. We find that the yellow group shares power voluntarily only to a small extent, but is more inclined to do so under the threat of punishment, despite the fact that punishment is not optimal in the continuation game. The blue group conditions punishment both on the voting rule and the electoral outcome: They are more inclined to punish an unfavorable outcome under the proportional rule. The evidence suggests that power sharing arises from the (suboptimal) willingness of the minority to punish selfish behavior.
Institutions are one of the most important factors determining political outcomes. Institutions, however, are not exogenous: they are themselves the result of conflicts between constituencies with different goals. Recognizing this fact, a recent but already significant literature, both in economics and in political science, has proposed positive theories of how political institutions are chosen. And, importantly, how does the allocation of power affect the extent to which the resulting payoffs are accepted? To put it differently: Are the relatively poor less inclined to revolt if they are more involved in the collective decision making? Answering these questions is ultimately an empirical exercise. It is however a hard question to study exclusively with field data that are rarely rich enough to allow the identification of the motives of political actors. In this paper we make a first step in addressing these issues by presenting a laboratory experiment. The advantage of this methodology is that it allows us to better control for the motivations of the agents and so to separate psychological from purely economic determinants of behavior.
In our experiment we study the collective choice of a voting rule by a group endowed with Voigt (1997 Voigt ( , 2011 . 2 Examples of prosocial behavior abound in the vast literature on the dictator game (first studied by Forsythe et al. (1994) and Hoffman et al. (1996) ), the ultimatum game (introduced by Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) ), and the trust game (see Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) ). See also the evidence on the problem of the commons, studied by Elinor Ostrom, and the literature on public good games. Regarding procedural concerns, a considerable amount of evidence provided by psychologists, sociologists and, more recently, economists supports the conjecture that procedures differ in both their perceived intrinsic fairness and the way in which they affect the acceptability of resulting payoff allocations. Within the economics literature, procedural fairness concerns have been documented; see Frey and Stutzer (2004) constitutional power when the entire population collectively decides between alternative payoff allocations during an election. In particular, one group selects the voting rule when another group with opposed interests has varying degrees of retaliatory power. We consider three treatments.
In the baseline treatment (henceforth T1), we consider an environment in which the players are divided into two groups: the yellows, the majority; and the blues, the minority. Players have to collectively choose between one of two options: Y or B. Preferences are perfectly aligned within a group, and perfectly opposed across groups: the yellows prefer Y , the blues B. The game has two stages. In the first stage, the yellows deliberate on how the final outcome will be chosen. Two options are available: a majoritarian rule, that guarantees that the yellows can exclude the blues from the decision making;
3 or a proportional rule, that guarantees that for each group, the probability of choosing their preferred allocation is proportional to their respective size in the population. In the second stage the collective choice is taken according to the chosen rule. We then consider two additional treatments. In the second treatment (T2), the members of the minority can choose to "voice", i.e., directly punish the prospective majority at some individual cost. In the third treatment (T3), the members of the minority can choose to "exit,"
i.e., to stop playing the game after they learn the decision rule chosen by the yellows, hence denying the majority the ability to benefit from the decision rule. All treatments have a unique
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies in which the yellows choose the majoritarian rule in the first stage, the voters vote for their preferred policies in the second stage, and (in T2 and T3) the minority never finds it optimal to punish (neither at the final stage nor at the interim stage).
We find four results of note. First, only a small (but significantly) positive fraction of members of the majority vote for a decision rule that favors the minority in the baseline treatment. The players are heterogeneous: In the absence of punishment (T1), 15% of the players vote altruistically more than 25% of the time (i.e., for the proportional rule); 60% of the players, instead, vote opportunistically more than 95% of the time. Second, despite the fact that retaliation is never optimal in equilibrium, the possibility of punishment by the minority induces a very significant increase in the fraction of majority members voting for a proportional rule. Indeed, it also induces the majority members to vote against their interest in the second stage when the majority rule is chosen. Third, the shift in the behavior of the majority is rational: punishments are often observed. Fourth, the choice of the voting rule changes the way the minority punishes the majority: Interestingly, an unfavorable outcome is punished more under the proportional rule than under the majoritarian rule. This indicates that the choice of the voting rule affects players' expectations and hence their reference point with regard to the resulting payoff allocation. The more empowered the minority is, the more they seem to (rationally) expect an outcome in their favor, and the more disappointed, and inclined to punish, they are when the outcome turns out to be poor.
One main conclusion suggested by the experiment is that the choice of decision rule is heavily affected both by rational considerations and by behavioral responses that cannot be easily disen-
tangled. The majority clearly shows opportunistic behavior (being overwhelmingly opportunistic in T1 and more "cooperative" in T2 and T3). Yet the majority is not responding to equilibrium expectations on the minority's behavior, since punishments are never optimal in equilibrium. Cooperation, therefore, seems to arise from the willingness of the minority to punish selfish behavior;
the majority "rationally" reacts to this behavioral expectation. Another conclusion is that allocations of power and allocations of payoffs interact in subtle ways: We do not find any evidence for purely procedural justice concerns; instead, the allocation of power affects the acceptance of payoff allocations.
Our paper contributes to three hitherto separated strands of the literature. The first is the theoretical literature on constitutional choice mentioned above.
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This literature naturally presupposes fully self-interested behavior consistent with game-theoretic predictions. Moreover, it assumes that all preferences are over absolute payoffs only, and that these preferences are not affected by institutional change.
Second, we contribute to the extensive experimental literature that has studied prosocial behavior in games. The game we study can be seen as a multi-agent version of the dictator and ultimatum games. In our game the first mover is not an individual, but a group (the yellow group); similarly the reaction to the offer is chosen by a group (the blues). However, our game differs in two important respects from the existing dictator and ultimatum games between groups:
5 First,we assume that utility is not transferable: payoffs depend only on the allocation of power and the choice of the electoral rule, direct transfers are not allowed. Second, there is no "fair" ex-post allocation of payoffs: One group will always get considerably less than the other in the end. We investigate whether the insights from the well-known individual dictator and ultimatum games carry over to our games of power sharing between groups, i.e., whether groups share power contrary to equilibrium predictions. Importantly, we are not investigating which behavioral determinants lead to power sharing, but only whether groups share power when this would not be predicted under standard assumptions.
The third strand of the literature to which our paper relates is the new experimental literature on endogenous institutions. This literature predominantly looks at social dilemmas, in particular public-good games. 6 In these games, players have similar preferences: All prefer the cooperative outcome over the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, subjects vote for institutions that successfully foster cooperation. By contrast, we focus on constitutional choice in a political-economy setting when players in different groups have opposing preferences. In our setting, no preference ranking over outcomes is common to everyone. Importantly, the majority group in our experiment is always already an interested party when selecting the voting rule. Such situations occur in reality when a collective cannot design its institutions behind the veil of ignorance and when specific classes have no access to constitutional power. Moreover, we contribute to this literature by studying how the minority reacts both to the degree of power sharing established by the endogenous voting rule and the electoral outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: We present our experimental design in Section 2; and the experimental procedure and our hypotheses are presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides our results. We conclude and discuss our findings in Section 5. Appendix A contains all figures and tables and Appendix B a sample of the instructions handed out to our experimental subjects.
Experimental Design
Our experiment implements three different games of collective decision making. In all three games one of the two groups has exclusive constitutional power to choose the decision rule. In the next two sections we describe the game in greater detail.
The Benchmark game
There are N = 2n players. Nature assigns a color -yellow or blue -to each player. There are two possibilities. In the first, players extract (with replacement) their type from an urn in which there are n + 1 yellows and n − 1 blues; in the second they extract (with replacement) their type from an urn in which there are n + 1 blues and n − 1 yellows. The players observe their type but they do not know from which urn it has been extracted. However, they know that the yellows are expected to be the majority since the first urn is x ≥ 1 times more likely than the second.
After observing their type, the players play a game with two stages:
• In the constitutional stage the yellows, and only the yellows, privately choose between two voting rules, rule 1 and rule 2. One yellow's choice is randomly drawn and implemented;
and all yellows are equally likely to be drawn. Then, all players are informed about which rule the yellows have implemented.
• In the voting stage all players participate in an election under the voting rule that was previously chosen. They privately vote for either alternative Y or alternative B. Alternative Y assigns a high payoff α + δ, with δ > 0, to each yellow and a low payoff α to each blue player; and alternative B does the reverse. The goal of the game described above (and of the variations described below) is to measure the extent to which a privileged group (the majority) shares power with an oppositional group (the minority). Before discussing the interpretation of the game in detail, it is useful to characterize the associated equilibrium behavior.
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of this game can be easily characterized by backward induction.
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In the voting stage, yellows vote for Y and blues vote for B in all equilibria.
Anticipating this, in the constitutional stage, the yellows choose the rule that makes a final outcome of Y most likely. With probability
, the yellows are the larger group (of size n + 1). Thus, a yellow assigns posterior probability
to the event that the yellows are the majority and probability p b = 1 − p y to the opposite event.
His expected payoff from selecting the random-dictator rule amounts to
while his expected payoff from the simple-majority rule is
Since π 2 y > π 1 y , the yellows choose the simple-majority rule. We conclude that in the unique PBE the simple-majority rule is chosen with probability one and the outcome of the election is Y with probability x 1+x and B with probability 1 1+x (depending on which group is majoritarian in the second stage).
To interpret the game we can now make two comments. First, at the end of the game the allocation implies that one group receives δ more than the other no matter what the voting rule is. In the unique equilibrium, however, the voting rule has an important impact on the expected allocation. In a majoritarian allocation the yellows always impose their preferred choice with probability one. In the random dictator allocation, on the contrary, the probability that the minority chooses the policy is proportional to the number of blues in the population. The second rule, therefore, is closer to a proportional rule. Although we model the decision rules in stylized form, they capture the essence of the problem we are interested in.
Second, the fact that we are assuming that the distribution of the population is random and that the players do not know their own group's size is not playing an important role in the game since we assume x is large and the equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium we would have if the yellows were always the majority (i.e., x is infinity). We have adopted this design only to introduce enough uncertainty to keep the choice interesting. 
Treatments with punishments
To explore the determinants of behavior in the previous game, we consider two additional treatments in which the minority can punish the majority. What varies between the three games is the strategy space of the group without constitutional power: It has no bargaining power whatsoever in the benchmark game. In the ex post punishment game, it can diminish the payoff of everyone in the privileged (yellow) group when the election is over. In the interim punishment game, it can again reduce the payoffs of everyone in the privileged group, but prior to the election and with the additional consequence of ending the game immediately. Thus, ex post punishment can be conditioned both on the voting rule chosen by the privileged group and the election outcome. By contrast, interim punishment can only be conditioned on the voting rule. Thus, all three games help us to measure the extent to which a privileged group shares power with the oppositional group. These differences between the three games allow us to test whether, and how, outcome-related preferences interact with procedures.
The ex-post punishment game The ex-post punishment game differs only in one respect from the benchmark game: It adds a punishing stage at the very end. On the punishment stage, each blue player privately chooses between accepting ("keep") and changing ("change") the final outcome of the election. One blue player in the group is randomly drawn, and his choice is implemented. (All blue players are equally likely to be selected.) If the selected choice is "keep", then the payoffs of this round remain unchanged. If it is "change", each yellow player loses δ + 2 points, the blue player whose choice was implemented loses 1 point, and the payoffs of the other blue player(s) remain unchanged. Again, all players are informed about the outcome of this stage.
It is easy to see that the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium with fully selfish payoff maximizers that has been characterized can be extended to this game: Since it becomes costly to choose "change" when one's choice is drawn, no blue should ever use the punishment option, and the final equilibrium outcome is the same as in the benchmark game.
The interim punishment game The interim punishment game moves the punishment stage up the game tree: Directly after the voting rule has been chosen and revealed to all players, the blues have to decide between "continue" and "exit". Again, one blue player is randomly drawn and his choice implemented. If it is "continue", the game proceeds as in the benchmark game. But if it is "exit", the game ends immediately, without the voting stage being reached, and payoffs are as follows: Each yellow in the group earns α − 2, the blue player whose choice has been implemented earns α − 1, and the other blue player(s) earn α. Thus, the payoffs after "exit" are the same as those after "change" in the ex-post punishment game when the electoral outcome has been Y .
The same argument as before applies: No blue should ever use the costly punishment option, and the final equilibrium outcome should be the same as in the two other games.
3 The experiment
Experimental Procedure
We conducted three experimental treatments, one for each game. The baseline treatment T1 implemented the benchmark game, treatment T2 implemented the ex-post punishment game, and the interim punishment game was implemented by treatment T3. The free software z-tree (Fischbacher (2007) ) was used to computerize all three games. Each treatment had six sessions.
In each session, 18 subjects participated anonymously in one of the three games. In each session, the game at hand was repeated over 30 rounds; and at the very end of the session one round was randomly drawn and dollar amounts equivalent to the payoffs were paid out to participants. At the beginning of each round, the computer randomly assigned the participants to three interaction groups of six: thus n = 3. Group membership changed randomly over different rounds. Moreover, the computer randomly determined whether the group consisted of n + 1 = 4 yellow and n − 1 = 2 blue players or instead of two yellows and four blues. Roles were assigned randomly, with random re-matching in every round. The matching group comprised all 18 participants in the session.
In each round, it was nine times more likely that the yellows were in the majority; and subjects knew this. Thus, x = 9 and p y = 18 19 . We chose a relatively high x because we wanted the yellows to be clearly perceived as the privileged group by all players. (The higher x is, the more the constitutional power of the yellows is of material consequence.) On the other hand, the small remaining uncertainty about the representation of one's role in the group guaranteed that even under the simple-majority rule and fully self-interested rational voting behavior, a blue player would see a small chance to get her favorite alternative and thus take the election seriously. The difference δ between the high and the low payoff was set to 5 in all sessions. In each session, we varied α randomly across rounds. It took the values 10, 15 and 20. We intentionally chose this payoff structure for the elections to keep the experiment simple.
At the beginning of the sessions and after reading the instructions, subjects had to solve a quiz in order to prove that they understood the game. They were allowed to ask the experimenters questions about the instructions in private. Once each subject knew the correct answers to all quiz tasks and had no more questions the experiment started. The subjects earned an average of approximately 18 US-Dollars, including a show-up fee of 5 Dollars. Each subject participated in no more than one session.
Two sessions of the baseline treatment were conducted at Princeton University, USA, and all others at the Technical University of Berlin, Germany. All participants were undergraduate students from a variety of different subject fields, with a natural focus on technical fields in the sessions run in Germany. They were recruited by university web pages and signs posted in the university buildings. At the end of each session, the participants answered a few demographic questions. Then, the computer randomly drew one round that was paid out to the participants privately and in cash.
Hypotheses
The Benchmark Game Both procedural and outcome-related fairness concerns can induce a yellow player to share power with the blues voluntarily, i.e., to choose the proportional rule with a significant probability in the baseline treatment. Placing a vote for the proportional rule would be a way for a yellow player to share the expected payoff of his color group with the group of blue players.
H1. In the baseline treatment, yellow players choose the proportional rule (rule 1) with positive probability.
Note that we do not intent to separate procedural from other fairness concerns. Rather, our intention is to test whether a privileged group -a group with constitutional power -voluntarily shares its power with an opposing group even if doing so is likely to have material consequences.
The ex-post punishment game: punishment behavior Since the yellows have the opportunity to share power prior to the election, the blues might react differently to a given election outcome, depending on which voting rule the yellows implemented. There are four possible histories on which the blues can condition their punishment behavior, since any of the two rules can in principle be combined with any of the two outcomes. These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:
H2. In the punishment treatment, blue players punish (i) more under the simple-majority rule than under the proportional rule, and (ii) more after Y than after B.
For instance, inequity averse blues might choose to punish (i.e., "change") whenever Y is implemented; this implies the second part of the above hypothesis. Moreover, both inequity aversion and negative reciprocity are possible motivations to opt for "change" whenever the yellows implemented the simple-majority rule, which implies the first part. Recall that our intention is not to test different theories of social preferences against each other. We aim at testing whether punishment incentives in bargaining games between individuals extend to games of collective decision making where groups instead of individuals are opposed to each other and payoffs are shared indirectly, by sharing power.
An especially interesting question concerns whether the blues might condition their reaction to the election outcome on the voting rule. Standard concepts of behavioral economics do not provide us with a unique prediction here. If, for instance, the electoral outcome is Y , then blues who exhibit negative reciprocity might want to punish the yellows more if they implemented the 10 Note that voting behavior, by contrast, is unlikely to be affected by fairness concerns: First, a yellow player could not reduce inequality by voting non-selfishly, since the difference between the high and the low payoff would still be 5. Moreover, if his non-selfish vote was effective, it would reverse the relative standings of yellows and blues and reduce the expected total payoff of the entire interaction group. Neither existing fairness theories nor any well-known experimental results predict such behavior.
simple-majority rule. The blues might ascribe unfriendlier intentions to the yellows if the latter refrained from sharing their power with them. However, the opposite might also be true: The implementation of the proportional rule might move the reference point of blue players more toward alternative B. Hence, if the electoral outcome is Y , blue players might experience stronger disappointment under the proportional rule than under the simple-majority rule, consequently feeling more inclined to punish. Similar arguments can be brought forward to show that no unique "behavioral" prediction can be derived regarding punishment after electoral outcome B.
Thus, we have to consider all alternatives:
H3(a). In the ex-post punishment game, and conditional on getting alternative Y , blue players punish more under the simple-majority rule than under the proportional rule.
H3(b).
In the ex-post punishment game, and conditional on getting alternative Y , blue players punish more under the proportional rule than under the simple-majority rule.
H4(a).
In the ex-post punishment game, and conditional on getting alternative B, blue players punish more under the simple-majority rule than under the proportional rule.
H4(b).
In the ex-post punishment game, and conditional on getting alternative B, blue players punish more under the proportional rule than under the simple-majority rule. 
Thus, if the difference between the two expected punishment probabilities becomes large enough, a selfish yellow player will try to make alternative B more likely to eschew punishment, either by choosing the proportional rule or by voting for B (or by both). Note that the difference in expected punishment probabilities under Y and B must exceed more than 70% in order to incentivize a deviation from the strategy to choose the simple-majority rule and vote for Y .
Suppose now that the blues condition their punishment only on the rule choice, not on the electoral outcome. In this case, q Y (r) = q B (r), and no yellow will ever vote for B. Hence, if we observe a significant number of yellows frequently voting for B in the ex-post punishment game, then this will be evidence that the yellows implicitly believe punishment to be conditioned on electoral outcomes, too. In sum, we get the following two hypotheses:
H5. The yellows select the proportional rule more often in the ex-post punishment game than in the benchmark game.
H6. The yellows vote for B more often in the ex-post punishment game than in the benchmark game.
The interim punishment game Both procedural fairness concerns and inequity aversion can lead blue players to choose "exit" when the simple-majority rule has been implemented by the yellows. If the expected exit probability under the simple-majority rule exceeds the expected exit probability under the proportional rule by a sufficient amount, then a selfish yellow will prefer the proportional voting rule. In this case, we should observe a higher frequency of the proportional rule in the interim punishment game than in the benchmark game. Thus, if compared to the benchmark game, the interim punishment game serves as a robustness check of the ex-post punishment game.
However, there are also valuable insights to be gained from the comparison of the interim and the ex-post punishment games. Does the prospective minority (the blues) react more negatively to the choice of the simple-majority rule if the reaction has to be immediate, as required in the interim punishment game? How willing are the blues to end the game if it is not played according to their preferred rule, compared to their willingness to punish outcomes that they do not like?
These questions are similar to the famous questions raised by Hirschman (1970) in his seminal book on Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: How willing are people to leave a system (an organization or state) if they do not like the way it is functioning, how willing are they to try and change it by staying inside and raising their "voice", and how willing are they to stay loyal without protest?
And which of the two ways to protest, exit or voice, contributes more to changing the system? Prima facie, there are no clear and easy answers; hence, it might help to investigate these questions experimentally. In sum, we get the following three hypotheses:
H7. In the interim punishment game, blue players choose "exit" more often under the simple-majority rule than under the proportional rule.
H8. There is no difference in the frequency with which the implementation of the voting rules makes the blue players choose "exit" in the interim and "change" in the ex-post punishment treatment.
H9. There is no difference in the frequency with which the yellow players choose the proportional rule in the interim and the ex-post punishment treatment.
In the next section, we will report the results of our experiment and relate them to our hypotheses.
Results
We first report the results from the constitutional stage and the voting stage in all three games. We then present our results regarding the punishment behavior of the blues in the two punishment games. Hereafter, we will refer to treatments rather than games, i.e., the baseline treatment (benchmark game), punishment treatment (ex-post punishment game) and exit treatment (interim punishment game).
Do subjects share power voluntarily?
We first consider the constitutional stage in the baseline treatment. Do yellow players voluntarily share power with the blues by choosing the proportional rule? Table 2 displays standard tests of whether the proportion of yellows doing so is significant.
Result 1. On average 12% of the decisions made by yellow players in the baseline treatment T1
are in favor of the proportional rule; this proportion is significantly positive at the 1% confidence level.
To study how these choices are distributed over individual players, we separated our subjects into four categories, depending on how frequently they chose the proportional rule in the role of a yellow. The first category comprises all subjects who opt for the proportional rule in less than 5% of the rounds in which they are yellow. They behave as predicted by the equilibrium solution of the game, taking into account a small error rate. The other three categories comprise players who choose the proportional rule 5 to 15%, 15 to 25% and more than 25% of the time they are yellow. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of subjects over these categories. As the first histogram in Figure 1 reveals:
Result 2. In T1, most players are behaving in a selfish-rational way; there is however a significant minority who does not:
• More than 60% of players opt for the majoritarian rule in more than 95% of the rounds in which they are yellow.
• More than 15% of all players opt for the proportional rule more often than in 25% of the rounds in which they are yellow.
We conclude that our subjects are heterogeneous: The willingness to share power seems to be much stronger in some players than in others.
To test whether the significant amount of yellow votes for the proportional rule is due to some lack of understanding of the game in the beginning of the sessions and vanishes when players learn by experience, we ran logit regressions with the dummy for the choice of the voting rule (rulechoice1) as dependent variable and the round number (period) as independent variable. The dummy rulechoice1 takes a higher value for a given player if he chose the simple-majority rule.
Hence, a positive coefficient of the variable "period" indicates that a learning effect exists and reduces the deviation from selfishness on the constitutional stage. Table 3 displays the regression results. To control for interdependency, we clustered the standard errors on the session level (1) or on the individual level (2); and we added fixed (3) or random individual effects (4). The results are robust: Indeed, we find evidence of learning in the baseline treatment: It is highly significant, but small in magnitude.
Power-sharing and threats
We now compare behavior in the constitutional stage across treatments; this will identify the effects of anticipated punishment on the choice of voting rule. We conducted a logit regression of dummies for the punishment and exit treatment on rulechoice1. T2 denotes the punishment treatment and T3 the exit treatment. Again, we controlled for interdependency by clustering the standard errors or adding fixed effects. Table 4 displays the results. We find that:
Result 3. The average number of yellow players choosing the proportional rule increases significantly under the threat of punishment, both when punishment occurs ex post and when it occurs on the interim stage.
the proportional rule less often than the yellow players in the four Berlin sessions; this difference is significant.
As a robustness check, we took the average of rulechoice1, obtaining one observation per session, and regressed it on the treatment dummies within an OLS regression. The results are displayed in Table 5 . Evidently, our findings are robust. This strongly supports our hypothesis H5.
Again, we took a closer look at the distribution of constitutional choices over individual players.
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The second and third histogram in Figure 2 refer to the punishment and exit treatment, respectively. As Figure 2 and Table 6 show, the behavioral effect of the threat of punishment is very significant.
Result 4.
Both in T2 and T3, we find a strong effect of anticipated punishment on rule choice:
• The share of players who choose the majoritarian rule more often than in 95% of the rounds in which they are yellow is more than halved under the threat of punishment.
• The share of players who choose the proportional rule more often than in 25% of the rounds in which they are yellow is more than doubled.
These findings suggest that the main effect is on the selfish players who would have played the equilibrium strategy in the absence of punishment: Most of them seem to react to the risk of punishment by choosing the proportional rule more than five times more often than they would have done otherwise.
As both Table 4 and 5 reveal, anticipation of punishment seems to have similar effects when the punishment looms directly after the rule choice and when it may hit at the end of the game.
If at all, the difference in effects is in favor of the exit treatment; there, the number of players who choose the proportional rule in more than 25% of the time is largest. However, the difference in average rule choices becomes significant only if session dummies are included (not shown in the tables).
11 As Eckel, Johnson and Wilson (2002) claim, we think it is important to go beyond simple treament comparisons and account for the heterogeneity of subject samples. We did so without, however, eliciting information about individual characteristics or beliefs.
treatments.
Moreover, the similarity of the two control treatments is not restricted to the constitutional stage. Punishment behavior is also very similar. We used a Mann-Whitney-U test to investigate whether the frequency of "change" differs from the frequency of "exit". As Table 13 shows, there is no significant difference. Taken together, these findings support our hypotheses H7-9.
Do subjects vote for giving others more than themselves if threatened?
In the previous subsection, we have seen that there are players willing to share power, and that even selfish players choose to do so if they anticipate being punished -directly or indirectlyfor doing otherwise. Before turning to the actual punishment behavior of the blues, we want to consider the voting stage. Do yellows try to eschew punishment by voting for alternative B? Table   7 displays standard tests whether a significant number of players do so.
On average, the share of yellow votes for alternative B (B Y vote) is slightly below 2% and 5% in the baseline and the exit treatments, respectively; but much higher, namely 13.7%, in the punishment treatment. All three means are significantly different from zero.
We tested for treatment differences by running a logit regression. Table 8 shows the results. The coefficients of the treatment dummies are positive and highly significant. If we repeat this exercise on the aggregate level, regressing the average (per session) of yellow votes for alternative B on the treatment dummies (Table 9) , only the effect for T2 remains robust. 12 Thus, we have that:
Result 6. The share of yellow votes for alternative B is significantly higher in both the punishment and exit treatment than in the baseline treatment. The effect for the punishment treatment is more robust.
The (smaller and less robust) increase in the exit treatment could be due to reciprocity: If the blues refrain from ending the game, the yellows seem to reward them by voting for alternative B with a higher probability than the yellows in the baseline treatment. By contrast, the large increase in yellow votes for B in the punishment treatment, compared to the baseline treatment, seems to be due to the effort of yellows to avoid punishment: If they are in the role of a yellow, subjects fear being punished if the outcome of elections is Y and vote for B to avoid this. Overall, we can conclude that yellow subjects believe their blue opponents to condition punishment on the electoral outcome Y and not only on the choice of the simple-majority rule. The strong effect of anticipated punishment on the yellows' voting behavior is in line with our hypothesis H6.
(How) do subjects punish the privileged group?
In the previous section, we saw that both threats, the threat of "exit" and the threat of "change", affect the behavior of the yellow players. In the constitutional stage, the threat of "exit" in the exit treatment has approximately the same effect as the threat of "change" in the punishment treatment. In the voting stage, however, the latter threat has a much larger effect. In sum, the fear of being punished affects the behavior of yellows more than positive reciprocity. A natural question which now arises is whether the punishment and exit behavior of the blues is -at least roughly -in line with the implicit beliefs of the yellows. Do blues indeed punish the yellows more under the simple-majority rule and after outcome Y ? Moreover, the punishment behavior of blues can tell us whether the voting rule affects acceptability of the electoral outcome: Does the benign choice of the proportional rule make the unfavorable outcome Y more acceptable for the blues?
Or is outcome Y easier to accept under a voting rule that makes this outcome more likely, like the simple-majority rule?
Consider first the punishment treatment. To test whether the blues conditioned their decision between "change" and "continue" in the punishment treatment on the voting rule alone, on the outcome of the elections, or on a combination of both, we ran probit regressions of "change"
(the dummy encoding the individual punishment decision of the blues) on "rule" (the dummy that encodes the implemented voting rule), and on "decide" (the dummy encoding the outcome of the elections). For a given blue subject, "change" took a higher value if the subject chose to punish. "Rule" takes a higher value if the simple-majority rule was implemented; and "decide" takes a higher value if Y was the outcome. We excluded yellow subjects from the regression and controlled for interdependency of the data. Table 10 reveals the results: Subjects punished more after outcome Y, but less under the simple-majority rule, although this latter effect is not robust.
Thus, only the second part of our hypothesis H2 is supported by evidence.
To look deeper into this (and to account for fact that "rule" and "decide" must be correlated),
we split the sample into two subsamples -one with outcome B ((1) in Table 11 ) and one with outcome Y ((2) in Table 11 ) -and regressed "change" on "rule" within each subsample. As Table   11 reveals, there seems to be a significant effect of the voting rule on the acceptability of outcome Y : In the subsample in which B was the electoral outcome, the blues do not punish the yellows significantly more under any of the two rules. By contrast, in the subsample in which Y was the outcome of elections, the blues punish the yellows significantly less under the simple-majority rule.
Overall, we can conclude that:
Result 7. We find evidence for the hypothesis that the unfavorable electoral outcome becomes more acceptable when it has been expected anyway under the chosen voting rule.
Hence, our findings regarding the behavior of the blues in the punishment treatment support hypothesis H3b rather than H3a. We do not find any evidence for either H4a or H4b.
Consider now the exit treatment. Here, the punishment choice of the blues is between ending the game on terms that are unfavorable to the yellows or continuing the game as in the baseline treatment. Due to the timing of the game, the blues have no possibility of conditioning their punishment choice on anything else than on the voting rule. To test whether the blues punish the yellows for choosing the simple-majority rule, we ran a logit regression of the dummy "exit" on "rule". "Exit" encodes the individual decision of the blues and takes a higher value if the blue subject concerned chose "exit". Again, we excluded the yellows from the regression and controlled for interdependency of the data. Table 12 displays the results.
Unsurprisingly, and supporting our hypothesis H8, we find that the blues choose "exit" significantly more often under the simple-majority rule than under the proportional rule. This can be due to, for instance, procedural fairness concerns or inequity aversion combined with the anticipation of outcome Y . Our results for the punishment treatment rather suggest the latter.
Conclusion and Discussion
While there is a vast experimental literature on sharing money, our paper presents the first experimental study on sharing constitutional power between groups. Although the games that we implemented in our experiment are similar in some respects to the familiar dictator and ultimatum games (for instance, we also compare voluntary sharing with sharing under off-equilibrium punishment threats), our games differ in too many respects from these well-known bargaining games to be directly comparable to them. For instance, we do not only look at group interaction, but also include the endogenous choice of the rule that is supposed to govern this interaction.
Moreover, payoffs are not shared directly, but indirectly by power sharing, and the "size of the cake" varies with the voting rule. Nonetheless, our results clearly show that some (but not all)
insights from the experimental literature on the dictator and ultimatum game carry over to our games of power sharing between groups: The privileged group (i.e., the majority) shares power voluntarily to a small extent. Thus, the prevalent determinant of their constitutional choices is self-interest. They become more inclined to share power if under threat of punishment, since they "rationally" react to an anticipated punishment threat which, in itself, is not consistent with equilibrium predictions.
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However, it is not empowerment but only a favorable electoral outcome that can appease the minority in our experiment: An electioral outcome that favors the majority is punished more often from the minority if the latter has been empowered by the proportional rule. Hence, empowerment of the underprivileged can backfire against the privileged group.
To see what can be learned from these findings, note firstly that our study is the first that complements the theoretical literature on endogenous constitutional design with a behavioral perspective. For instance, Robinson (2000, 2001) argue that throughout history, political elites tended to extend suffrage to disadvantaged classes if the latter can credibly threaten them with a revolution or other forms of social unrest, in particular when the opportunity costs of participating in a riot are sufficiently low. While this is certainly an important insight, our experiment suggests that even if no credible threat is possible under standard assumptions, i.e., when a cool-minded cost-benefit analysis would prevent everyone from rioting, behavioral motives like negative reciprocity can nonetheless trigger a revolution, and members of the elite are quick A second contribution of our paper is the clear prediction concerning the effect of endogenous voting rules on the acceptability of electoral outcomes, a nexus completely ignored by the existing literature. We show that punishment is conditioned both on the voting rule and the electoral outcome, and that the privileged group understands this and often votes against their immediate interests in order to appease the other group. The underprivileged group is more inclined to accept an unfavorable electoral outcome (i.e., to refrain from retaliation) if they were disempowered by the electoral rule. From this we can conclude that there is a trade-off: On the one hand, sharing power increases the likelihood of electoral outcomes in favor of the underprivileged, thus decreasing the risk of punishment. On the other hand, sharing power increases the risk of punishment for electoral outcomes that do not favor the underprivileged.
Overall, our experimental study suggests that behavioral determinants both directly affect endogenous constitutional design and influence the way in which endogenous constitutions shape collective decision making. Following the instructions, there will be a practice session and a short comprehension quiz.
All questions on the quiz must be answered correctly before continuing to the paid session.
At the end you will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. Note that we are bound not to use deception, so all information in these instructions is true. If something is unclear to you while reading, or if you have other questions, please let us know by raising your hand. We will then answer your questions individually.
As a matter of course, your anonymity and the anonymity of the other participants will be guaranteed throughout the entire experiment. You will neither learn about the identity of the other participants, nor will they learn about your identity.
General
This is an experiment in decision-making. It consists of thirty rounds. At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly draws one of the rounds; and the dollars that you have earned in this round will be paid out to you in cash. The exact sequence of the stages of the experiment is explained in detail in the following.
Players
There are 18 participants in total. At the beginning of each round, the computer randomly assigns the participants to 3 groups of 6. During each round, you interact exclusively with the participants of the group you are assigned to. No participant knows the identity of the other members of his or her group. Group membership changes randomly over different rounds. 1. In state 1, the computer randomly assigns the role of a "yellow player" to 4 out of the 6 participants in a group and the role of a "blue player" to the remaining 2 participants.
2. In state 2, the computer randomly assigns the role of a "blue player" to 4 out of the 6 participants in a group and the role of a "yellow player" to the remaining 2 participants.
Although nobody observes the state, each participant is informed about his (her) own role, i.e.
whether he (she) is a yellow or a blue player. Nobody observes the role of any other participant. Note that since the assignment of roles is random and is repeated each round, roles change across rounds. In each round your role is indicated on the upper left of your screen. This procedure is repeated 30 times.
